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Abstract
The Neolithic was marked by a transition from small and relatively egalitarian
groups, to much larger groups with increased stratification. But the dynamics of this
remain poorly understood. It is hard to see how despotism can arise without coercion,
yet coercion could not easily have occurred in an egalitarian setting. Using a quanti-
tative model of evolution in a patch-structured population, we demonstrate that the
interaction between demographic and ecological factors can overcome this conundrum.
We model the co-evolution of individual preferences for hierarchy alongside the degree
of despotism of leaders, and the dispersal preferences of followers. We show that vol-
untary leadership without coercion can evolve in small groups, when leaders help to
solve coordination problems related to resource production. An example is coordinat-
ing construction of an irrigation system. Our model predicts that the transition to
larger despotic groups will then occur when: 1. surplus resources lead to demographic
expansion of groups, removing the viability of an acephalous niche in the same area
and so locking individuals into hierarchy; 2. high dispersal costs limit followers’ ability
to escape a despot. Empirical evidence suggests that these conditions were likely met
for the first time during the subsistence intensification of the Neolithic.
Keywords: despotism — dispersal — egalitarian — hierarchy — leadership — Neolithic
Introduction1
Understanding how leadership and dominance behaviours in humans have changed over evo-2
lutionary time is relevant to both biology and the social sciences. What drove the transition3
from largely egalitarian hunter-gatherer groups, where leadership was facultative and dom-4
inance attenuated [1], to the hereditary and more despotic forms of leadership that arose5
during the Neolithic [2, 3]?6
On the one hand, “coercive” (or “agency”) theories have focused on the development of7
inequality that was made possible with the origin of food storage and agriculture, allowing8
dominant individuals to build up resource surpluses that could be used to consolidate their9
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power [4, 5, 6]. On the other hand, “functional” (or “integrative”) theories have addressed10
the benefits that leaders provide to other group members. In particular, as human group size11
increased during the Neolithic [7, 8], the resulting scalar stress [9] would have necessitated12
increased hierarchy in order to solve various coordination and collective action problems13
[10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Leadership could have been favoured to solve problems including14
the coordinated harvesting of marine resources [17, 18, 19], the construction of irrigation15
systems [20, 21, 22, 23], and defensive warfare [24, 25].16
But when considered alone as competing theories, both coercive and functional models17
struggle to explain the transition to despotism seen during the Neolithic. Purely coercive the-18
ories cannot explain why individuals would initially choose to follow a despot [16, 26]. Boehm19
[1] presents evidence suggesting that present-day hunter-gatherers actively form coalitions20
to suppress would-be dominants, and argues that pre-historic hunter-gatherers did likewise.21
Moreover, the advent of projectile weapons is likely to have made such coalitions particularly22
e↵ective [27], tipping the balance of power away from an individual dominant. Thus the23
question is, why would individuals not continue to prevent despotic behaviour? But if indi-24
viduals are unconstrained in their choice of leader, then it is di cult to see how despotism25
could develop.26
Several authors have argued that an adequate model of the origin of increased social27
stratification must incorporate both functional and coercive aspects [22, 28, 15]. There is28
evidence that aspiring leaders drove the development of technology that increased subsistence29
intensification and raised population carrying capacity [22, 17]. For example, construction30
of irrigation systems would have allowed more land to be used for agriculture, providing31
an incentive for individuals to follow the leader. This fits with functional theories. On the32
other hand, the surplus resources that this provided could then be appropriated by leaders33
to further their own ends and consolidate their power. This is particularly the case given34
that irrigation farmers would be tied to the system, making dispersal away from a despot35
di cult. Spencer [22] developed a verbal model of this for the case of irrigation systems in36
prehispanic Mexico, and warfare in prehispanic Venezuela. However, the feedbacks between37
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population size, functional aspects of leadership, and the development of despotism remain38
poorly understood and are di cult to capture with verbal models.39
Here we present an evolutionary model of the dynamics of the transition from small-scale40
egalitarian to larger-scale hierarchical groups, which integrates both functional and coercive41
aspects of leadership. We use a demographically explicit model of a patch-structured popu-42
lation, in which surplus resources translate into increased reproductive output for those who43
receive them, as has been common throughout human history [29, 30]. Unlike previous work,44
this allows us to capture the ecological and demographic interactions between subsistence45
intensification, dispersal costs, and the evolution of despotic behaviour.46
The model47
Life cycle and social traits48
We consider a population that is subdivided into a finite number, Np, of patches, which are49
subjected to local stochastic demography (as per [31, 32]). The lifecycle consists of discrete50
and non-overlapping generations, as follows. (1) Social interactions occur on each patch with51
its members possibly choosing a leader, who may a↵ect local resource production. (2) Each52
individual on a patch has a Poisson distributed number of o↵spring, with the mean deter-53
mined by the outcome of social interactions and local resource abundance (defined explicitly54
below). (3) Adults of the previous generation perish. (4) Individuals of the descendant gen-55
eration may disperse, conditional on the result of the stage of social interactions. Dispersing56
individuals su↵er a cost CD, such that individuals survive dispersal with probability 1 CD,57
and then enter a patch taken at random from the population (excluding the natal patch).58
Each individual in this population carries a cultural trait, h. This takes the value zero or59
one, and determines whether the carrier has a preference for hierarchy (h = 1) or acephalous60
(h = 0) social organisation. In each generation and for each patch, one individual is chosen61
at random from the subset of individuals with a preference for hierarchy (h = 1) to act as the62
4
leader (this could be an individual with unusual characteristics such as strong organisational63
abilities). There are then up to three classes of individuals on a patch: (i) the individual64
chosen as the leader (l class); (ii) the remaining individuals with h = 1 that act as followers65
(f class); (iii) acephalous individuals (with h = 0) that choose not to have a leader (a class).66
When in the role of a leader, an individual is assumed to expresses a culturally inherited67
trait, z, which represents the proportion of the surplus it generated that it keeps for itself.68
This is a continuous variable between zero and one. O↵spring of the leader are assumed to69
remain philopatric, but o↵spring of followers or acephalous individuals may disperse. We70
denote by df the conditional dispersal strategy of the o↵spring of a follower. Specifically, df71
is the maximum proportion of the surplus that an individual will tolerate the leader of the72
parental generation taking, and is thus continuous between zero and one. This assumption73
accords with evidence from social psychology that individuals tend to disperse from groups74
with autocratic leaders [33]. Finally, da determines the unconditional dispersal probability75
of the o↵spring of an acephalous individual, which is independent of the outcome of social76
interactions. The assumption that the o↵spring of a leader remain philopatric is appropriate77
in this model, since by remaining philopatric they increase the probability that one of their78
lineage will be chosen as leader on that patch in the next generation. Moreover, since79
o↵spring inherit the z trait of their parent, it is less biologically realistic that an individual80
would disperse based on how much of the surplus their parent took, when they themselves81
would take the same amount. We have, however, also investigated the e↵ects of relaxing the82
assumption that the o↵spring of a leader must remain philopatric (Appendix S3).83
Each individual carries all four cultural traits (h, z, df , and da) which are all assumed to84
be transmitted vertically from parent to o↵spring [34] with independent probability 1   µ.85
When a mutation occurs at trait h (probability µ), an o↵spring adopts the opposite trait.86
When a mutation occurs at the three remaining continuous traits, Gaussian mutation is87
performed by addition of a truncated Gaussian distributed random variable centred around88
the current trait value, with variance 0.1.89
We stress that our model aims to capture qualitative behavioural trends. A more quan-90
5
titatively accurate model would include individual and social learning of behavioural traits91
within a generation. For example, hierarchy preference could be a continuous trait updated92
by an individual’s estimate of the likely payo↵ from following a leader, and from copying93
the behaviour of more successful individuals. However, these processes would largely result94
in the same qualitative outcome as the vertical transmission with di↵erential reproduction95
that we model, apart from the fact that they operate on a much shorter timescale.96
Reproduction97
The mean number of o↵spring produced (of the Poisson distribution in stage two of the life98
cycle) by individuals within patches is assumed to follow a Beverton-Holt model, with two99
niches (e.g., [31, 35]). The two niches correspond to either having a leader (individuals of100
the l and f classes), which we refer to as the hierarchical niche H, or remaining acephalous101
(acephalous niche A, containing individuals of class a). The degree of competition between102
the niches is set by two parameters, ↵AH and ↵HA, which represent the per capita e↵ects103
of individuals in the hierarchical niche on those in the acephalous niche, and vice versa,104
respectively. The total number of individuals in the hierarchical niche (leader plus followers)105
on patch j at time t is denoted by nHj(t), and the number of individuals in the acephalous106
niche by nAj(t).107
According to these assumptions, we write the mean number of o↵spring produced, re-108
spectively, by a leader, a follower, and an acephalous individual on patch j at time t as109
wlj(t) =
rlj(t)
1 + nHj(t)/KHj(t) + ↵HAnAj(t)
wfj(t) =
rb
1 + nHj(t)/KHj(t) + ↵HAnAj(t)
waj(t) =
rb
1 + nAj(t)/KAj(t) + ↵AHnHj(t)
. (1)
The numerator in each expression can be thought of as the maximal birth rate of an indi-110
vidual in the corresponding class. For followers and acephalous individuals, this is given by111
a constant rb, while for the leader this depends upon the outcome of surplus production,112
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as defined below. The denominator in each expression can be thought of as the intensity of113
density-dependent competition. This depends on a time dependent variable Kij(t), which114
is a proxy for the carrying capacity of niche i on patch j (maximum population size). The115
exact carrying capacity in the Beverton-Holt model is a function of all fitness parameters,116
but increases directly with K. In the classical one niche deterministic case, K gives the car-117
rying capacity when rb = 2, which is a value we use throughout. Hence, we refer (loosely)118
to K as the “carrying capacity”. Kij(t) is a↵ected by surplus resource production (detailed119
below), which allows for local demographic expansions due to social interactions [31, 32].120
Surplus production121
In each patch individuals take part in a social enterprise, which may generate surplus re-122
sources for their niche. Individuals may also fail to produce this surplus, and to capture123
these two cases in a probabilistic way we let124
 ⌧j(t) =
8><>:
1 with probability s(n⌧j(t), g⌧ )
0 otherwise,
where  ⌧j(t) is the indicator random variable taking the value one if the surplus is produced125
in niche ⌧ 2 {A,H} on patch j at time t, zero otherwise. Surplus production occurs with126
probability127
s(n⌧j(t), g⌧ ) = exp( g⌧n⌧j(t)), (2)
where g⌧ is a parameter giving the gradient of how the probability of surplus generation128
changes with the number of individuals in the niche (“social group size”). We assume that129
g⌧ is positive, such that the probability of success decreases with increasing social group130
size. This represents the e↵ects of scalar stress. We further assume that gH < gA, such that131
the success probability declines at a slower rate with increasing group size in the presence132
of a leader, and that for a given group size, groups with a leader are more likely to generate133
the surplus.134
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How surplus a↵ects acephalous individuals135
We relate surplus production to the “carrying capacity” of acephalous individuals by assum-136
ing that137
KAj(t) = Kb +  Aj(t) k (1  exp [  knAj (t)])
+ [1   Aj(t)] (1   ✏) (KAj (t  1) Kb) , (3)
where Kb is the baseline capacity. If the surplus is generated, this is then increased by138
 k (1  exp [  knAj (t)]), which is a positive concave function of  knAj (entailing diminishing139
returns), where  k sets the gradient of the carrying capacity increase, and nAj is taken as140
the amount of surplus resource produced. Alternatively the surplus can be thought of141
as proportional to population size, with conversion factor  k (this is assumed to hold for142
both niches). The parameter  k sets the maximum possible increase in carrying capacity.143
If the surplus is not successfully generated, the carrying capacity is then given by (1  144
✏)Kb + ✏KAj (t  1), where ✏ is the surplus decay rate from one generation to the next, and145
KAj(0) = Kb (if ✏ < 1, there is some ecological inheritance of modified carrying capacity).146
How surplus a↵ects leaders and followers147
For individuals in the hierarchical niche, the leader keeps a proportion of any surplus for148
itself, as given by the value of its z-trait. Let zlj(t) denote the z-trait of the leader on patch149
j at time t, then the carrying capacity of individuals in the hierarchical niche is given by an150
analogous expression to that of acephalous individuals (eq. 3); namely,151
KHj(t) = Kb +  Hj(t) k (1  exp [  k{1  zHj(t)}nHj (t)])+
(1   Hj(t)) (1   ✏) [KHj (t  1) Kb] , (4)
where {1   zHj(t)}nHj (t) is the amount of surplus used to increase the carrying capacity152
of the leader and its followers. The remainder zlj(t)nHj (t) of the surplus is retained by153
the leader and used to increase its own birth rate (which has occurred throughout human154
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history [29, 30]) as follows155
rlj(t) = rb +  Hj(t) r (1  exp [  rzlj(t)nHj (t)]) , (5)
where  r gives the gradient of the increase in birth rate with respect to the absolute mag-156
nitude of the surplus that the leader takes. The parameter  r gives the maximal possible157
increase in the leader’s birth rate. This represents the maximum degree of despotism that it158
is possible for a leader to exert. This will depend upon both ecological and social factors, and159
in particular, on the degree to which followers are able to resist coercion. Where followers160
have little power to resist the leader, then we would expect a large value of  r. Conversely,161
if followers are able to resist coercion to a large degree, for example by forming coalitions,162
then a smaller value of  r would be more plausible.163
Conditional dispersal of followers164
To close the model, it only remains to specify how o↵spring of followers disperse conditionally165
on leader behaviour (o↵spring of acephalous individuals disperse unconditionally, and the166
o↵spring of the leader remain philopatric). Denoting by df,ij(t) the dispersal preference of167
follower o↵spring i on patch j at time t, that o↵spring is assumed to disperse if:168
zlj(t) > df,ij(t),
that is, if the leader of its parent took more than its threshold value.169
The model defines a stochastic process for the four evolving traits (h, z, da, df), the170
number of individuals in each niche (nA, nH), and their respective carrying capacities (KA,171
KH). Because of the non-linearities of the model, which result from the interactions of all172
of these variables, we analyse it using individual-based simulations.173
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Results174
We focus on the e↵ect that the following demographic and ecological parameters have on the175
transition to despotism: (i) the e↵ect that a leader has on surplus generation (gA relative176
to gH); (ii) the degree to which surplus resources produce demographic expansion ( k); (iii)177
the cost of dispersal (CD). The other parameters used in the simulations, unless otherwise178
specified, are: Kb = 20, rb = 2,  k = 0.05,  r = 0.1, gH = 0.01, ↵AH = ↵HA = 0.03, ✏ = 0.1,179
µ = 0.01, Np = 50.180
The voluntary creation of hierarchy through cultural evolution181
Figures 1a and 1c illustrate that when leaders confer a large advantage in surplus generation182
(gA is large relative to gH), hierarchical individuals can invade a population of acephalous183
individuals. This is because for a given group size, hierarchical individuals are more likely to184
produce a surplus than acephalous individuals on their patch (eq. 2). Individuals that receive185
surplus resources then enjoy a fitness increase, mediated by a reduction in the intensity of186
density-dependent competition in their niche. Consequently, they produce more o↵spring187
than individuals that do not receive a surplus. In this way, when leaders increase the188
likelihood of surplus generation, and share some of this surplus with their followers, then189
hierarchical individuals can outcompete acephalous individuals.190
Crucially, this can occur even when leaders evolve to retain a large proportion of the191
surplus for themselves (Fig. 1c). This is because even when leaders retain some of the surplus,192
followers can still each receive more extra resource than they would in acephalous groups,193
where the surplus would be generated less frequently. This demonstrates the voluntary194
creation of hierarchy, where individuals that accept inequality in their groups are better195
o↵ than those that remain egalitarian. Whether or not this is the case depends upon the196
magnitude of the advantage that leaders confer in surplus generation.197
Figures. 1e and 1g illustrate the case where leaders do not provide much advantage in198
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surplus generation. In this situation, acephalous individuals each receive on average a larger199
amount of surplus resources than followers of a leader. This is because acephalous groups are200
almost as likely to generate the surplus as hierarchal groups, but all of the surplus is shared201
amongst themselves rather than some being retained by a leader. Consequently, hierarchy202
is not favoured, and the unconditional dispersal probability trait of acephalous individuals,203
da, depends mainly on the dispersal cost and decreases as the cost increases (figs. 1e and 1g,204
further discussion in Appendix S1). We discuss the conditional dispersal trait of followers,205
and its co-evolution with the proportion of surplus that leaders retain, below.206
The co-evolution of group size and hierarchy207
When individuals receive surplus resources, this leads to a reduction in competition for208
resources with other individuals on the patch in their niche. As a result, their niche can209
support a larger number of individuals (eqs. 3 and 4), leading to an increase in group size.210
Figures 1b and 1d illustrate that when hierarchy invades, it drives an increase in group size.211
For example, in Fig. 1b the population initially starts out fixed for acephalous individuals,212
who produce some surplus. This surplus drives an increase in their local number from the213
base value of 20, to around 40. But because of the problems of coordinating in large groups214
without a leader (represented by a large value of gA), they are unable to reliably generate215
the surplus in groups above this size. Thus, their group size stabilises around this value.216
However, as hierarchy invades group size increases up to 80 individuals. This is because the217
coordination advantages of having a leader (gH < gA) mean that hierarchical individuals are218
able to continue generating the surplus in larger groups.219
The increase in group size is driven by a positive feedback loop in which surplus produc-220
tion increases carrying capacity, causing an increase in group size, which then in turn allows221
greater amounts of surplus to be generated (eq. 2). This positive feedback loop stops when222
either (i) groups are too large for additional surplus to be reliably generated (eq. 2), or (ii)223
diminishing returns in the value of the surplus mean that the extra surplus produced by one224
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more individual is not enough to increase carrying capacity by at least one individual (eqs. 3225
and 4). When gH is smaller than gA, then the feedback loop can stop at a larger group size226
for hierarchical individuals than for acephalous individuals. Thus the ability of leaders to227
solve coordination problems in larger groups, combined with the e↵ects of surplus resources228
on demography, means that the invasion of hierarchy produces a transition to larger-scale229
social groups.230
The transition to a larger group size is crucial to the stability of hierarchy. This is231
because acephalous individuals experience density-dependent competition with hierarchical232
individuals on their patch, and vice versa (eq. 1). So the larger the absolute number of233
hierarchical individuals, the more they suppress the fitness of acephalous individuals by234
outcompeting them for shared resources, such as space. Conversely, when there are few235
hierarchical individuals, then it is relatively easy for acephalous individuals to re-invade and236
hierarchy to collapse. The parameter  k controls the extent to which surplus production237
can increase group size. As Figure 2 shows, when this is low then although hierarchy can238
invade, it does not remain stable. As  k increases, however, then the invasion of hierarchy239
brings about a large increase in group size that suppresses mutant acephalous individuals.240
The transition to larger groups thus locks individuals into hierarchy.241
The degree to which group size increases when hierarchy invades also depends upon how242
much of the surplus the leader retains for itself. Specifically, when leaders evolve to share243
more surplus resources with their followers, then the group can grow to a larger size (Figs. 1a244
and 1b, compared to 1c and 1d).245
When does cultural evolution lead to despotism?246
What determines how much of the surplus the leader takes? A selection pressure exists for247
a leader to take more of the surplus, since this translates into an increased birth rate (eq. 5)248
and hence a greater number of o↵spring relative to the other hierarchical individuals on249
its patch (eq. 1). Moreover, because the leader of the next generation is chosen by random250
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sampling of the o↵spring of hierarchical individuals on the patch, this increased reproduction251
also increases the probability that one of the current leader’s o↵spring will remain as leader252
in the next generation. This continued occupancy of the leader role then increases the253
reproductive share of the leader’s lineage even further.254
However, a pressure also exists for the leader to take less surplus. This is because the total255
amount of surplus generated increases with increasing group size (eqn. 2), which provides256
an incentive for a leader to have more followers. But followers have a choice in leader since257
they may disperse from the group and join a di↵erent one, conditional on the amount of258
surplus that the leader takes (as given by their df trait). Thus, if the leader takes too much259
of the surplus then it will lose followers. This then means that less surplus will be generated260
for hierarchical individuals in the next generation, which can cause hierarchical individuals261
to be outcompeted by acephalous individuals on their patch.262
The proportion of surplus that the leader takes is therefore a trade-o↵ between opposing263
selection pressures. The balance depends upon the cost of dispersal – how easily individuals264
may leave one leader and follow another. If the cost of dispersal is low, then leaders are265
constrained in how much of the surplus they can monopolise. This is because when dispersal266
costs are low then followers evolve low tolerance values of df , such that they readily disperse267
if leaders retain a larger proportion of the surplus (Fig. 1a). Consequently, leaders evolve268
to share a large fraction of the surplus with their followers in order to prevent them from269
dispersing. On the other hand, as dispersal cost increases then followers evolve larger toler-270
ance values of df in order to avoid paying a high dispersal cost (Fig. 1c). As a result, the271
strategy of leaders co-evolves to appropriate more of the surplus for their own reproduction,272
since their followers will not readily disperse to other groups.273
Thus in an ecology where dispersal is costly, evolution leads to more despotic groups.274
Moreover this increased despotism is voluntarily tolerated by followers, in the sense that275
individuals which allow the leader to retain more surplus before dispersing outcompete both276
acephalous individuals, and followers that more readily disperse. Figure 3 demonstrates this277
co-evolution of follower dispersal preference and leader strategy for the full range of dispersal278
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costs.279
Sensitivity to parameters and model assumptions280
We systematically varied the advantage in surplus production that leaders confer relative281
to acephalous groups (gA). When leadership does not confer much advantage in surplus282
production, then acephalous individuals outcompete hierarchical individuals (Fig. S2). We283
also investigated the e↵ect of varying the coercive power of the leader (Fig. S3), as measured284
by the maximal birth rate advantage it can enjoy from surplus production ( r). As this285
increases then for a given dispersal cost leaders evolve to retain more of the surplus for286
themselves. Further, we investigated the e↵ects of varying the intergenerational decay in287
surplus resources, ✏, including allowing for complete decay (Appendix S2 and Fig. S4).288
Finally, we allowed the o↵spring of a leader to disperse (Appendix S3 and Fig. S5). We289
found that varying all of these does not qualitatively a↵ect our main results.290
Discussion291
We have presented a model which captures the dynamics of the transition from small egal-292
itarian to larger despotic groups. In line with work by Hooper et al. [15], our model293
demonstrates that hierarchical systems of social organisation can be voluntarily created by294
followers, rather than having to be imposed by a leader through coercion. This is in con-295
trast to the current trend in archaeology that focuses on “agency”, that is, on how leaders296
promote their own interests at the expense of others. By such accounts, leadership is seen297
as benefiting the leader rather than the followers [4, 6]. Yet while it is certainly the case298
that leaders should be expected to promote their own ends, the agency of followers must299
also be considered [28, 1, 36]. If leadership provides no benefit to followers, then it is hard to300
see why previously egalitarian individuals would accept despotic appropriation of resources,301
unless there were coercive institutions such as a military already in place. But such institu-302
tional coercion could not have been paid for before a leader appropriated surplus resources,303
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making it hard to see how hierarchy could become established [16, 26].304
The origin of despotism in human societies is similar to the problem addressed by re-305
productive skew theory [30]. In skew models, despotism is measured in terms of how much306
of the reproduction within a group is monopolised by a dominant individual. This is con-307
strained by the outside options that subordinates have, either to live alone or in a di↵erent308
group. Skew models predict that dominants should behave more despotically as the feasi-309
bility of outside options decreases [37]. However, they do not consider the benefits leaders310
can provide to other group members in terms of surplus production, and so do not address311
how despotic leadership could evolve from an initial stable state of egalitarianism. Here, we312
have extended the basic logic of skew theory to incorporate the feedback between surplus313
production and demography that was likely to have been important during the Neolithic.314
Previous work has explicitly modelled the formation of institutions to solve various col-315
lective action problems related to food production, as relevant to demographic growth in the316
Neolithic [31]. It was shown that groups could evolve institutionally-coordinated punishment317
to secure cooperation in generating surplus resources, driving demographic expansion. This318
paper builds upon these results by investigating the political ecology of such institutions, in319
terms of the opportunities that they create for despotism as group size increases.320
Hooper et al. [15] showed that hierarchy can evolve if leaders help to secure cooperation in321
the production of large-scale public goods, using a model with complete dispersal between322
groups every generation. Their static analysis implied that despotism should rise as the323
cost for followers of switching to a di↵erent leader increases. Our model has independently324
confirmed that this prediction holds in a demographically realistic setting, where the cost325
of switching leader is given a biological basis in terms of dispersal cost. Moreover, our326
model incorporates dynamic group size alongside explicit co-evolution of leader despotism327
and follower tolerances. This framework has allowed us to demonstrate that the equilibrium328
of large groups with despotic leadership can actually be reached by gradual evolution, from329
an initial state of small egalitarian groups. Understanding the dynamics of this transition330
is one of the most pressing issues in Neolithic social evolution [16, 26]. But previous models331
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have not addressed the interaction between subsistence intensification, population size, and332
dispersal costs. Our results demonstrate that the interaction between these factors provides333
a cogent explanation for the transition to large and despotic groups. We now turn to discuss334
the empirical evidence for this interaction during the Neolithic.335
There is strong evidence that the presence of a leader conferred advantages in solving336
coordination problems related to food production in both complex hunter-gatherers [38, 28,337
18] and agriculturalists [21, 22, 23]. Arnold [17] stresses the role of leaders in technological338
innovation that increased carrying capacity. For example the Chumash, a maritime culture339
in the north American Pacific, developed large boats made of rare materials, which required340
teams of specialists to construct. Consequently, only high status individuals could finance341
and organise their construction. The boats greatly increased productivity by allowing access342
to new marine resources, and by increasing the amount of resource that could be transferred343
simultaneously. This increased carrying capacity [17], but also led to increased stratification344
by providing surplus resources that boat owners could monopolise.345
There is also evidence that leaders coordinated the construction of irrigation systems346
[21, 22, 23], even if not in the state-building sense argued by Wittfogel [20]. Spencer [22]347
presents archaeological evidence that the Purro´n dam, an irrigation system in prehispanic348
Mexico, was constructed by a faction that aspired to leadership. Because canal irrigation was349
essential for agriculture in this area, other individuals would have benefitted from following350
this faction in order to gain access to water [22]. Spencer presents evidence that population351
growth subsequently occurred, causing the leadership faction to coordinate many followers352
in the construction of a larger dam. Moreover, there is evidence that this expansion of353
both population size and the irrigation system led to increased social stratification, with354
elites beginning to trade surpluses that they controlled for prestige goods [22]. This fits the355
feedback between demographic expansion and hierarchy formation captured by our model.356
An important question is why despotic hierarchy evolved under intensive food production,357
but not under hunting and gathering? Our results suggest that demography plays an im-358
portant role in the stability of despotism. When groups are small, then hierarchy can easily359
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collapse if despots take too much resource. But if groups are larger, then density-dependent360
competition means that hierarchical individuals can outcompete acephalous individuals for361
shared resources, even when despots retain most of the surplus. Demographic expansion362
can therefore cause individuals to become locked into hierarchy, by destroying the viabil-363
ity of a previous non-hierarchical niche. Although human health appears to have declined364
with the origin of agriculture [39], and agriculture may initially have been less productive365
than hunter-gathering [40], cemetery data strongly implies that a demographic expansion366
indeed occurred during the Neolithic [8]. Other data indicates that the population density of367
hunter-gatherer groups is usually below 0.1 person/sq. mi., while that of early dry farmers368
is around 4 persons/sq. mi, and that of early irrigation farmers from 6 to 25 person/sq. mi369
[7]. The construction of irrigation systems, for example, could thus trigger the co-evolution370
of demographic expansion and despotism.371
Our model predicts that despotism should increase with increasing dispersal costs, for372
which there is strong empirical support [41, 5, 30]. Carneiro [41] presents evidence that state373
formation (increased hierarchy) happens when relatively small areas of productive agricul-374
tural land are surrounded by geographical barriers. This then allows leaders to extract375
tribute from other individuals, whose options to leave the group are limited. For example376
in Peru, early states evolved where agriculture was practiced in narrow valleys, making dis-377
persal di cult. By contrast, states did not so readily evolve in the Amazon basin where378
there were large expanses of agricultural land available, making dispersal relatively easy [41].379
Allen [5] also stresses the role of dispersal costs in the creation of the despotic ancient Egyp-380
tian state. He argues that the deserts bordering the Nile made dispersal very costly, thus381
allowing the Pharaohs to extract a large surplus from agriculturalists. Similarly, techno-382
logical development can increase dispersal costs. For example, irrigation farming was likely383
to tie agriculturalists to the irrigation system, again limiting free movement and choice of384
leader [20, 22].385
In conclusion, our model predicts that despotic social organisation will evolve from an386
initial state of egalitarianism when: 1. leaders generate surplus resources leading to de-387
17
mographic expansion of their groups, which removes the viability of an acephalous niche388
in the same area; 2. high dispersal costs subsequently limit outside options for followers389
by restricting choice of leader. The empirical evidence reviewed here suggests that these390
conditions were likely to have been satisfied during the Neolithic.391
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Figure legends495
Figure 1: Illustration of ecological conditions under which either hierarchical (a–d) or496
acephalous (e–h) individuals are favoured by the co-evolution of culturally transmitted be-497
havioural traits with demography. When the presence of a leader confers a large advantage498
in surplus generation (gH much smaller than gA), then individuals with a preference for hi-499
erarchy can invade an acephalous population (a and c). Successful generation of the surplus500
then drives an increase in population size (b and d). The degree of despotism, measured501
by the amount of surplus the leader monopolises for its own reproduction, increases with502
increasing dispersal cost (a and c). Conversely, if the presence of a leader does not confer a503
large advantage in surplus generation then hierarchy fails to invade (e–h) and groups remain504
acephalous. Parameters:  r = 5,  k = 100.505
Figure 2: Stable hierarchy requires that surplus resources translate into demographic ex-506
pansion of group size (large value of  k). Demographic expansion removes the viability of507
the acephalous niche on a patch, locking individuals into hierarchy. Panels show the stability508
of hierarchy on a single patch in the metapopulation. Parameters: gA = 0.15,  r = 2.509
Figure 3: As dispersal cost increases, followers tolerate their leader behaving more despoti-510
cally (a). This in turn means that they enjoy a smaller increase in their carrying capacity, as511
the leader is able to direct more of the surplus into increasing its own reproductive success512
relative to that of its followers (b). Results show the long-run time averages over 3 ⇥ 106513
generations of the stochastic simulation. Parameters:  r = 20, gA = 0.15,  k = 100.514
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Appendix S1: Evolution of acephalous individuals’ dis-
persal probability trait, da
In order to better understand the evolution of dispersal in acephalous individuals, we con-
sider in this section a version of the model without hierarchical individuals present.
The dispersal probability of acephalous individuals decreases under natural selection as
dispersal costs increase, in agreement with classic theory on the evolution of dispersal [1, 2].
Figure S1a shows a baseline case where there is no possibility for surplus resources to de-
crease local resource competition ( k = 0), and hence to benefit individuals. In this case,
acephalous individuals evolve high dispersal rates if dispersal is costless (Fig. S1a). Intu-
itively this is because by dispersing, individuals reduce local density-dependent competition
for resources with their relatives.
However, where surplus resources can reduce local resource competition ( k = 100), as in
theMain Text, then acephalous individuals do not evolve such high dispersal rates even when
dispersal cost is zero (Fig. S1b). This is because the absolute amount of surplus generated
is proportional to group size, so that larger groups can generate a larger amount of surplus.
In particular, the presence of one extra group member can produce a marginal surplus
that increases carrying capacity by more than one. In that case, by remaining philopatric
and helping to generate a larger surplus, an individual can reduce local competition for its
relatives by a greater amount than if it dispersed. This explains why acephalous individuals
do not evolve very high dispersal rates in Fig. 1e of the Main Text, even though dispersal is
costless. The e↵ect becomes greater as the probability of acephalous individuals generating
the surplus decreases (Fig. S1b). Intuitively, this is because as the probability of surplus
generation decreases then it pays individuals to make sure that when it is generated, it is as
large as possible. However, in all cases we find that dispersal does not evolve to zero, since
individuals can on average reduce local kin competition more by sometimes dispersing, even
when surplus production favours larger groups.
2
Appendix S2: E↵ect of varying the surplus decay rate, ✏
Here we show that our main conclusions are robust to varying the carrying capacity surplus
decay rate, ✏. There is still an increase in the proportion of the surplus retained by the
leader as dispersal cost increases from zero, across the full range of ✏ (Fig. S4a). This holds
even when there is complete decay in the surplus between generations (✏ = 1). However,
larger decay rates cause large fluctuations in carrying capacity, and hence group size, when
the surplus is not generated. Consequently, the mean group size over time is smaller for
larger decay rates (Fig. S4b).
Appendix S3: E↵ect of allowing the o↵spring of a leader
to disperse
Finally, we have investigated the e↵ect of allowing the o↵spring of a leader to disperse,
conditional on the proportion of the surplus that their parent took in the previous generation
(Fig. S5). In that case, we find that leaders evolve to retain less of the surplus for themselves
when dispersal costs are high. In particular, the proportion of surplus that the leader retains
reaches its maximal value for intermediate dispersal costs (around 0.2 in Fig. S5). As
dispersal costs increase beyond this, leaders slowly begin to reduce the proportion of surplus
that they retain. This is in order to prevent their o↵spring from conditionally dispersing,
and hence su↵ering a high dispersal cost.
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Figure S1: The dispersal probability trait of acephalous individuals, da, decreases with
increasing dispersal cost. If surplus resources cannot decrease local competition ( k = 0)
then high dispersal rates evolve if dispersal is costless (a). This is because dispersal reduces
local competition with relatives. However, if the surplus can decrease local competition
( k = 100, as in the Main Text) then there is a selection pressure for reduced dispersal, since
larger groups can generate a larger surplus (b). Results show the long-run time averages
over 3⇥ 106 generations of the stochastic simulation.
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Figure S2: E↵ect of varying the relative advantage that a leader confers on surplus generation
on (a) the frequency of individuals with a preference for hierarchy, (b) how despotically the
leader behaves, and (c) population size. Results show the long-run time averages over 3⇥106
generations of the stochastic simulation. Parameters:  r = 10.
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Figure S3: E↵ect of varying the maximal increase in birth rate that the surplus can confer
on a leader, which corresponds to the degree of coercive power that the leader can exert.
(a) The proportion of surplus that the leader retains increases with increasing power. (b)
Population size correspondingly decreases due to less surplus being shared with followers.
Results show the long-run time averages over 3⇥106 generations of the stochastic simulation.
Parameters: gA = 0.15.
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Figure S4: The main conclusions of the model hold across the range of ✏ (a). However, a
larger value of ✏ causes larger fluctuations in group size between generations, resulting in
a smaller mean group size across time (b). Results show the long-run time averages over
3⇥ 106 generations of the stochastic simulation.
Parameters:  r = 20, gA = 0.15.
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Figure S5: When the o↵spring of a leader can disperse based on the proportion of surplus that
their parent took, then leaders evolve to take less surplus, particularly for higher dispersal
costs. Results show the long-run time averages over 3 ⇥ 106 generations of the stochastic
simulation.
Parameters:  r = 20, gA = 0.15.
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